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Abstract. The category of open games, which provides a strongly com-
positional foundation of economic game theory, is intermediate between
symmetric monoidal and compact closed. More precisely it has counits
with no corresponding units, and a partially defined duality. There ex-
ist open games with the same types as unit maps, given by agents with
the strategic goal of predicting a future value. Such agents appear in
earlier work on selection functions. We explore the algebraic properties
of these agents via the symmetric monoidal bicategory whose 2-cells are
morphisms between open games, and show how the resulting structure
approximates a compact closed category with a family of lax commuta-
tive bialgebras.
1 Introduction
Open games [5] provide a strongly compositional foundation to economic game
theory. In this paper we continue the investigation of the categorical structure
of open games.
An open game is, in general, a fragment of a game that can be embed-
ded in a context of an appropriate type. Open games are the morphisms of a
symmetric monoidal category and, hence, admit categorical composition and
monoidal product operators. These represent sequential and simultaneous play
respectively. Games are built compositionally, beginning with simple ‘atomic’
open games such as individual decisions and payoff functions, using the compo-
sition operators. This is closely related to the categorical open systems research
programme [4].
A related line of work has investigated an approach to game theory based on
selection functions (see for example [2,3]). These come in two flavours: single-
valued selection functions have a type of the form (X → R) → X , and multi-
valued selection functions (X → R)→ P(X). These allow the replacement of the
argmax operator, which is itself a selection function of type (X → R)→ P(X),
with other operators with similar types. In particular, a worked example in [10]
considers games in which argmax is replaced by a fixpoint operator of type
(X → X)→ P(X), defined by fix(k) = {x | x = k(x)}. This provides an elegant
toy model of coordination as a strategic aim.
Any selection function can be viewed as an open game, representing a single
decision made by an agent whose ‘rationality’ is defined by that selection func-
tion. In particular, the argmax selection function defines a ‘classically rational’
agent, which is one of the atomic open games. In this paper we consider the
agents that arise from the fixpoint selection function. The strategic goal of these
agents is to correctly predict a future value.
The category of open games admits a ‘partial duality’ −∗ that is defined
on all objects but on few morphisms, and there are ‘counit’ open games εX :
X ⊗ X∗ → I that are compatible with this duality whenever it is defined. In
this sense, the categorical structure of open games is similar to a ‘fragment’ of
compact closed structure [12]. The fixpoint agent has the type ηX : I → X⊗X
∗,
and due to its interpretation as a past prediction of a future value, is a natural
candidate to be the dual ‘unit’.
Unfortunately we do not obtain a compact closed category. We investigate
what structure we do obtain, using the symmetric monoidal bicategory whose
2-cells are globular morphisms of open games, obtained as a special case of
more general morphisms in [6,9]. We also investigate a family of monoids and
comonoids in the category of open games that are closely related to the fix-
point agent, which similarly narrowly fails to define a family of commutative
bialgebras.
Both of these structures fail in precisely the same way: Morphisms which
‘should’ equal the identity are instead equal to a certain morphism that is not
related to the identity by a 2-cell. This morphism is an open game that has
the same behaviour as the identity open game in equilibrium, but can behave
differently in general.
2 Open games
In this section we provide a theoretically self-contained definition of open games.
However for reasons of space we find it necessary to refer the reader to [5] or [7]
for motivation and further details, including the links between open games and
classical game theory.
Definition 1. Let X,S, Y,R be sets. An open game G : (X,S) → (Y,R) is
defined by the following data:
– A set Σ(G) of strategy profiles
– A play function PG : Σ(G)×X → Y
– A coplay function CG : Σ(G)×X ×R→ S
– An equilibrium function EG : X × (Y → R)→ P(Σ(G))
A pair (x, k) : X × (Y → R) is called a context for G, and a strategy profile
σ ∈ EG(x, k) is called a Nash equilibrium in context (x, k). Intuitively, a context
contains the behaviour of a game’s environment: x says what happened in the
past (that is relevant to G), and k says what will happen in the future (that is
relevant to G) given G’s behaviour.
A general open game G : (X,S) → (Y,R) is denoted by a string diagram of
the form
X Y
RS
G
In the string diagram language, a set on the left of a pair always labels a wire
pointing forwards, and a set on the right of a pair always labels a wire pointing
backwards.
Note that in previous work, open games G : (X,S) → (Y,R) are defined to
have a more general best response function
BG : X × (Y → R)→ P(Σ(G)×Σ(G))
rather than an equilibrium function EG . Any equilibrium game in this sense
determines an open game in our sense by letting
EG(x, k) = {σ | (σ, σ) ∈ BG(x, k)}
While EG records only the Nash equilibria of a game in a context, the function
BG records additional information about off-equilibrium best responses, that is
to say, how players might correct themselves after playing strategies that are not
in equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is precisely a strategy profile which is a best
response to itself. The reason for using EG rather than BG in this paper will be
made clear in the next section.
Definition 2. An open game is called strategically trivial if it has exactly one
strategy profile and that strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium in every context.
Strategically trivial open games are also called zero-player open games. A
strategically trivial open game (X,S)→ (Y,R) determines and is determined by
a pair of functions X → Y and X ×R→ S. Such a pair of functions is called a
lens [11].
Definition 3. Let f : X → Y be a function. There are evident strategically
trivial open games (f, 1) : (X, 1)→ (Y, 1) and (1, f) : (1, Y )→ (1, X).
In the string diagram language, the open games (f, 1) and (1, f) are respec-
tively denoted
X Yf XY f
Definition 4. For each set X, there is an evident strategically trivial open game
εX : (X,X)→ (1, 1).
εX is called a counit and is denoted
XX
Crucially, note that there is no natural strategically trivial game (1, 1) →
(X,X) that could serve as a corresponding ‘unit’. As such, we do not allow a
backwards-pointing wire to bend around to point forwards in our diagrams.
Definition 5. Let X,Y,R be sets, and let E : (Y → R)→ P(Y ). We define an
open game AE : (X, 1)→ (Y,R), called an agent, as follows:
– The set of strategy profiles is Σ(AE) = X → Y
– The play function is PAE (σ, x) = σ(x)
– The coplay function is CAE (σ, x, r) = ∗
– The equilibrium function is EAE (x, k) = {σ | σ(x) ∈ E(k)}
Functions E : (Y → R) → P(Y ) are called multi-valued selection functions,
and are studied in detail in [10]. For example, let argmax : (Y → R) → P(Y )
be the function defined by
argmax(k) = {y | k(y) ≥ k(y′) for all y′ : Y }
Then Aarg max : (X, 1) → (Y,R) is an open game representing a single decision
by an agent who observes an element of X , and then chooses an element of Y
in order to maximise a real number.
Another example of a selection function is the fixpoint operator fix : (X →
X)→ P(X) defined by fix(k) = {x | x = k(x)}. The fixpoint selection function
is the subject of a worked example in [10], where it is used to model a ‘Keynesian
agent’ whose strategic aim is to vote with the majority within a voting contest.
The open games Afix : (1, 1)→ (X,X) are the main subject of this paper.
Definition 6. Let G : (X,S)→ (Y,R) and H : (Y,R)→ (Z,Q) be open games.
We define an open game H ◦ G : (X,S)→ (Z,Q) as follows:
– The set of strategy profiles is Σ(H ◦ G) = Σ(G)×Σ(H)
– The play function is PH◦G((σ, τ), x) = PH(τ,PG(σ, x))
– The coplay function is CH◦G((σ, τ), x, q) = CG(σ, x,CH(τ,PG(σ, x), q))
– The equilibrium function is
EH◦G(x, k) = {(σ, τ) | σ ∈ EG(x, λy.CH(τ, y, k(PH(τ, y))))
and τ ∈ EH(PG(σ, x), k)}
Definition 7. Let G : (X,S) → (Y,R) and H : (X ′, S′) → (Y ′, R′) be open
games. We define an open game G ⊗ H : (X ×X ′, S × S′) → (Y × Y ′, R × R′)
as follows:
– The set of strategy profiles is Σ(G ⊗H) = Σ(G)×Σ(H)
– The play function is PG⊗H((σ, τ), (x, x
′)) = (PG(σ, x),PH(τ, x
′))
– The coplay function is CG⊗H((σ, τ), (x, x
′), (r, r′)) = (CG(σ, x, r),CH(τ, x
′, r′))
– The equilibrium function is
EG⊗H((x, x
′), k) = {(σ, τ) | σ ∈ EG(x, λy.pi1(k(y,PH(τ, x
′))))
and τ ∈ EH(x
′, λy′.pi2(k(PG(σ, x), y
′)))}
The operator ⊗ defines a monoidal product with unit I = (1, 1).
These sequential and parallel composition operators correspond to sequential
and simultaneous play of games. In the string diagram language they correspond
respectively to end-to-end juxtaposition with joining matching wires, and dis-
joint side-by-side juxtaposition. Any string diagram that does not contain a wire
bending ‘forwards’ (in the opposite way to the counit diagram) can be consis-
tently interpreted as an open game, given interpretations of the individual nodes
[8].
Definition 8. Let G,H : (X,S) → (Y,R) be open games. A (globular) mor-
phism of open games α : G =⇒ H consists of a function α : Σ(G) → Σ(H)
satisfying the following conditions:
– For all σ : Σ(G) and x : X, PG(σ, x) = PH(α(σ), x)
– For all σ : Σ(G), x : X and r : R, CG(σ, x, r) = CH(α(σ), x, r)
– For all σ : Σ(G), x : X and k : Y → R, if σ ∈ EG(x, k) then α(σ) ∈ EH(x, k)
Two different, more general definitions of morphisms between pairs of open
games with different types are considered in [6,9]. However they agree on the
globular morphisms of open games, that is those that are identity on the end-
points, which is precisely this definition.
Theorem 1. There is a symmetric monoidal bicategory Game where the 0-cells
are pairs of sets, the 1-cells are open games and the 2-cells are morphisms of
open games.
(See [13] for a clear definition of symmetric monoidal bicategories.)
The bicategory structure allows us to talk about isomorphism and natural
isomorphism of open games, where G ∼= H means that there is an isomorphism
Σ(G) ∼= Σ(H) that respects play, coplay and equilibria (in both directions).
There is a ‘horizontal’ symmetric monoidal 1-categoryGameh whose morphisms
are isomorphism classes of open games. Technically, our string diagrams are
valued in this 1-category and denote isomorphism classes.
Proposition 1 ([7], section 2.2.13). Let f : X → Y be a function. Then
there is an isomorphism of open games
XY
f
∼=
X
Y f
Definition 9. A covariant object is a pair of the form (X, 1), and a contravari-
ant object is a pair of the form (1, S). We denote the former by X+ and the
latter S−. Given f : X → Y , we also write f+ for (f, 1) and f− for (1, f).
These respectively define covariant and contravariant monoidal functors from
(Set,×, 1) to (Gameh,⊗, I).
Every object (X,S) of Game is isomorphic to the tensor product X+ ⊗ S−
of a covariant object and a contravariant object. By lifting the unique (delet-
ing/copying) comonoids (X, !X , ∆X) from the cartesian monoidal category of
sets, we obtain a commutative comonoid structure (X+, !+X , ∆
+
X) on every co-
variant object, and a commutative monoid structure (X−, !−X , ∆
−
X) on every con-
travariant object. We give these the following special syntax in the diagrammatic
language:
X
!+X : X
+ → I
X
X
X
∆+X : X
+ → X+ ⊗X+
X
!−X : I → X
−
X
X
X
∆−X : X
− ⊗X− → X−
3 The fixpoint agent
Definition 10. For each set X we define an open game ηX = Afix : I → (X,X).
Explicitly, ηX is given by the following data:
– The set of strategy profiles is Σ(ηX) = X
– The play function is PηX (x, ∗) = x
– The coplay function is CηX (x, ∗, x
′) = ∗
– The equilibrium function is EηX : 1 × (X → X) → P(X) is given by
EηX (∗, k) = {x : X | x = k(x)}
In the string diagram language, we denote ηX as follows:
X
X
Intuitively, the fixpoint agent forces the values on its two ports to be equal in
a Nash equilibrium. However, even if we only care about the behaviour a game in
equilibrium, the reason that an equilibrium is an equilibrium ultimately depends
on the behaviour of the game off-equilibrium. That is, the players in the game
participate in counterfactual reasoning of the form “What if I played a different
strategy?” This is the high level explanation of why we cannot obtain a compact
closed category of open games with the fixpoint agents as its unit, even after
taking a quotient to identify open games of our choosing.
With this notation, the coordination game example from [5], figure 2 is de-
noted
X
This represents two agents, each trying to predict the choice of the other. The
set of strategy profiles of this game is X × X , and the equilibria are precisely
those of the form (x, x), i.e. the strategy profiles in which the agents successfully
coordinate. This game is isomorphic to the open game representation of a stan-
dard coordination game with real-valued payoffs, such as Meeting in New York.
It is closely related to the Keynesian beauty contest worked example from [10],
in which three agents try to coordinate with the majority.
In a compact closed category, units and counits of a monoidal product X⊗Y
are built compositionally from the units and counits of X and Y . The counits
in Game satisfy this condition, and so do the fixpoint agents:
Proposition 2. η1 = idI : I → I.
Proof. Trivial.
Proposition 3. Let X and Y be sets. Then ηX×Y : I → (X × Y,X × Y ) is
naturally isomorphic to the following open game:
X
Y
X
Y
Proof. Let G be the depicted game. Its set Σ(G) of strategy profiles is naturally
isomorphic to X × Y . It is trivial to check that the play and coplay functions
agree. Given k : X × Y → X × Y , using the definition of ⊗ we have that
(x, y) ∈ EG(∗, k) iff x = pi1(k(x, y)) and y = pi2(k(x, y)). This is equivalent to
(x, y) = k(x, y), or (x, y) ∈ EεX×Y (∗, k).
If we use the more general best response formulation of open games, the
previous result fails, even laxly. This is the reason that we use the equilibrium
set formulation in this paper. (It is a rare example of a result about open games
that holds in equilibrium, but can fail off-equilibrium.)
Proposition 4. Let X be a set. Then there is morphism of open games
=⇒
(Note that the empty string diagram on the right hand side denotes the
identity open game on I.)
Proof. The sets of strategy profiles are respectivelyX and 1. Since every strategy
on the left is an equilibrium, the unique function X → 1 defines a morphism of
open games.
Definition 11. For each set X, we define open games ⊲X : X
+ → X+ and
⊳X : X
− → X−, respectively denoted
X X X X
to be equal to the ‘snake’ open games defined by
X
X X
X
Up to natural isomorphism, ⊲X is concretely given by the data
– The set of strategy profiles is Σ(⊲X) = X
– The play function is P⊲X (x
′, x) = x′
– The coplay function is C⊲X (x
′, x, ∗) = ∗
– The equilibrium function E⊲X : X×(X → 1)→ P(X) is given byE⊲X (x, ∗) =
{x}
and ⊳X is given by the data
– The set of strategy profiles is Σ(⊳X) = X
– The play function is P⊳X (x, ∗) = ∗
– The coplay function is P⊳X (x
′, ∗, x) = x′
– The equilibrium function E⊳X : 1×(1→ X)→ P(X) is given byE⊳X (∗, k) =
{k(∗)}
There are unique functions Σ(⊲X) → Σ(idX+) and Σ(⊳X) → Σ(idX−),
namely x 7→ ∗, however they fail to define morphisms of open games. In particu-
lar, for x′ 6= x we have P⊲X (x
′, x) = x′ 6= x = Pid(X,1)(∗, x). The same argument
applies to any choice of function Σ(idX+) → Σ(⊲X) or Σ(idX−) → Σ(⊳X).
Thus we do not obtain a compact closed bicategory [13], or even a weaker lax
or colax variant of one.
The problem remains open of finding a sense in which ⊲X is related to
idX+ and ⊳X is related to idX− . The authors explored the following equivalence
relation on the class of open games of a fixed type:
Definition 12. Let G,H : (X,S) → (Y,R) be open games. Given a context
(x, k) : X × (Y → R) and strategies σ : Σ(G), τ : Σ(H), we write σ ∼(x,k) τ if
PG(σ, x) = H(τ, x) =: y and CG(σ, x, k(y)) = CH(τ, x, k(y)). We write G ∼ H
if for every σ ∈ EG(x, k) there is τ ∈ EH(x, k) with σ ∼(x,k) τ , and for every
τ ∈ EH(x, k) there is σ ∈ EG(x, k) with σ ∼(x,k) τ .
This relation satisfies ⊲X ∼ idX+ and ⊳X ∼ idX− , and apparently captures
the intuition that these games are ‘the same’ in the sense that they have the same
behaviour in every Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, ∼ is not compositional:
there are open games G ∼ G′ and H ∼ H′ for which H ◦ G 6∼ H′ ◦ G′. An
interpretation of this is that morphisms of open games require behaviour to be
the same in all contexts, not just those in equilibrium. This extra generality is
crucial to making morphisms of open games form a monoidal bicategory, that is
to say, to be compositional.
Proposition 5. Let f : X → Y be a function. Then there is a morphism of
open games
X
Yf
X
=⇒
X
Y
f
Y
Proof. The sets of strategy profiles of these games are respectively X and Y .
The function f : X → Y defines a morphism of open games.
This is the first instance of a general pattern in this paper, that we can move
an open game backwards past a white node.
Proposition 6. For any open game G : X+ → Y + between covariant objects
there is a morphism of open games
X YG
X
=⇒ X G Y
Y
For any open game H : Y − → X− between contravariant objects there is a
morphism of open games
Y H X
X
=⇒ Y H X
Y
Proof. For the former pair, the function X × Σ(G) → Σ(G) × Y is given by
(x, σ) 7→ (σ,PG(σ, x)). For the latter pair, the function Σ(H)×X → Y ×Σ(H)
is given by (σ, x) 7→ (CG(σ, ∗, x), σ).
4 Bialgebras in Game
In section 2 we defined copying operators, which are lifted from the copying
comonoids in the category of sets. In a compact closed category, the transpose
of a copying operator is a dual ‘matching’ operator, and these typically inter-
act as a (special commutative) Frobenius algebra. (The category of relations
provides an example.) In this section we define open games that behave like
matching operators when in equilibrium, and investigate their properties. Sur-
prisingly, these ‘imperfect’ matching operators interact with the ‘true’ copying
operators not as a Frobenius algebra, but (almost) as a commutative bialgebra.
Definition 13. Let X be a set. We define open games
X
¡+X : I → X
+
X
X
X
∇+X : X
+ ⊗X+ → X+
X
¡−X : X
− → I
X
X
X
∇−X : X
− → X− ⊗X−
as follows. In each case, the set of strategy profiles is Σ = X. ¡+X and ∇
+
X have
play functions P
¡
+
X
(x′, ∗) = x′ and P
∇
+
X
(x′, (x1, x2)) = x
′. ¡−X and ∇
−
X have
coplay functions C
¡
−
X
(x′, ∗, ∗) = x′ and C
∇
−
X
(x′, ∗, (x1, x2)) = x
′. The equilib-
rium sets are respectively
E
¡
+
X
(∗, ∗) = X E
∇
+
X
((x1, x2), ∗) =
{
{x1} if x1 = x2
∅ otherwise
E
¡
−
X
(∗, ∗) = X E
∇
−
X
(∗, k) =
{
{pi1(k(∗))} if pi1(k(∗)) = pi2(k(∗))
∅ otherwise
Proposition 7. There are morphisms of open games
X X ⇐⇒
X
X
and
X X ⇐⇒ X
X
(which are, however, not isomorphisms).
Proof. The top-left and top-right games have sets of strategy profiles X and
X ×X . The functions x 7→ (x, x) and (x1, x2) 7→ x2 define morphisms of open
games.
The bottom-left and bottom-right games have sets of strategy profiles X and
X ×X . The functions x 7→ (x, x) and (x1, x2) 7→ x1 define morphisms of open
games.
The distinction between ⊲X ,⊳X and the identities means that the white
structures fail to be monoids and comonoids, in precisely the same way that
Game fails to be compact closed. However, this is the only condition that fails.
Proposition 8. There are natural isomorphisms of open games
X
X
X
X ∼=
X
X
X
X
and
X
X
X
X
∼= X
X
X
X
Proposition 9. There are natural isomorphisms of open games
X
X
X ∼=
X
X
X
and
X
X
X
∼= X
X
X
Next we show that despite the white structures not being monoids and
comonoids, the black and white structures interact as a lax bialgebra; see for
example [1] for a graphical presentation of the bialgebra axioms.
Proposition 10. There are morphisms of open games
X
X
=⇒
X
X
X
X
=⇒
X
X
X
X
=⇒
X
X
X
X
=⇒
X
X
Proposition 11. There are morphisms of open games
X
=⇒
X
=⇒
Proposition 12. There are morphisms of open games
X
X
X
X
=⇒
X
X
X
X
and
X
X
X
X
=⇒
X
X
X
X
In each of the previous propositions, the morphism is given by the copying
function X → X ×X or deleting function X → 1 in the category of sets.
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